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Abstract
We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme,
and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority
of honest parties. That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest
parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest (as captured by
a set-Nash analogue of trembling hand perfect equilibrium). The protocol only requires a stan-
dard (synchronous) broadcast channel, tolerates both early stopping and incorrectly computed
messages, and only requires 2 rounds of communication.
Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models have either
required an honest majority, used strong communication channels that enable simultaneous
exchange of information, or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria. They all also
required a nonconstant number of rounds of communication.
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A major concern in the design of distributed protocols is the possibility that parties may deviate
from the protocol. Historically, there have been two main paradigms for modeling this possibility.
One is the cryptographic paradigm, where some parties are honest, meaning they will always follow
the specied protocol, and others are malicious, meaning they can deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol. The other is the economic paradigm, where all parties are considered to be rational,
meaning that they will deviate from the protocol if and only if it is in their interest to do so.
Recently, some researchers have proposed studying mixtures of these traditional cryptographic
and economic models, with various combinations of honest, malicious, and rational participants.
One motivation for this that it may allow a more accurate modeling of the diversity of participants
in real-life executions of protocols. Along these lines, the papers of Aiyer et al. [3], Lysyanskaya and
Triandopoulos [32], and Abraham et al. [2] construct protocols that achieve the best of both worlds.
Specically, they take protocol properties that are known to be achievable in both the cryptographic
model (with honest and malicious parties) and the economic model (with only rational parties),
and show that protocols with the same properties can still be achieved in a more general model
consisting of malicious and rational parties.
Our work is of the opposite avor. We consider properties that are not achievable in either
the cryptographic or economic models alone, and show that they can be achieved in a model
consisting of both honest and rational parties. Specically, we consider the task of secret recon-
struction in secret sharing, and provide a protocol that is fair, meaning that all parties will receive
the output, given rational participants together with a small minority of honest participants. In
standard communication models, fairness is impossible in a purely economic model (with only
rational participants) [22, 26] or in a purely cryptographic model (with a majority of malicious
participants) [12]. Previous works in the individual models achieved fairness by assuming strong
communication primitives that allow simultaneous exchange of information [22, 21, 2, 26, 30, 31, 23]1
or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria [14, 9, 19, 40, 26], whereas we only use a
standard (i.e. synchronous but not simultaneous) broadcast channel and achieve a standard notion
of game-theoretic equilibrium (namely, a trembling hand perfect equilibrium).
Thus, our work illustrates the potential power of a small number of honest parties to maintain
equilibria in protocols. These parties follow the specied strategy even when it is not in their
interest to do so, whether out of altruism or laziness. While we study a very specic problem
(secret sharing reconstruction, as opposed to general secure function evaluation), we hope that
eventually the understanding developed in this clean setting will be leveraged to handle more
complex settings (as has been the case in the past).
Below, we review the cryptographic and economic paradigms in more detail. We then introduce
the secret-sharing problem we study and survey recent works on this problem in the purely economic
model. We then describe our results and compare them to what was achieved before.
1.1 The Cryptographic Paradigm
In the cryptographic paradigm, we allow for a subset of the parties to deviate from the protocol
in an arbitrary, malicious manner (possibly restricted to computationally feasible strategies), and
the actions of these parties are viewed as being controlled by a single adversary. Intuitively, this
1Actually, the impossibility results of [22, 26] also hold in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel and
thus the works of [22, 21, 2, 26] use additional relaxations, such as allowing the number of rounds and/or the sizes of
the shares to be unbounded random variables.
1captures worst-case deviations from the protocol, so protocols protecting against such malicious and
monolithic adversaries provide a very high level of security. Remarkably, this kind of security can be
achieved for essentially every multiparty functionality, as shown by a series of beautiful results from
the 1980's [47, 20, 10, 7, 41]. However, considering arbitrary (and coordinated) malicious behavior
does have some important limitations. For example, it is necessary to either assume that a majority
of the participants are honest (i.e. not controlled by the adversary) or allow for protocols that are
unfair (i.e. the adversary can prevent some parties from getting the output). This follows from a
classic result of Cleve [12], who rst showed that there is no fair 2-party protocol for coin-tossing
(even with computational security), and then deduced the general version by viewing a multiparty
protocol an interaction between two super-parties, each of which controls half of the original parties.
Lepinski et al. [30] bypass this impossibility result by assuming a strong communication primitive
(\ideal envelopes") which allow simultaneous exchange of information, but it remains of interest to
nd ways of achieving fairness without changing the communication model.
1.2 The Economic Paradigm
In the economic paradigm, parties are modeled as rational agents with individual preferences, and
will only deviate from the protocol if this is in their own self interest. This approach has become
very popular in the computer science literature in recent years, with many beautiful results. There
are two aspects of this approach:
1. Design computationally ecient mechanisms (i.e. functionalities that can be implemented by
a trusted mediator) that give parties an incentive to be truthful about their private inputs,
while optimizing some social choice function, which measures the benet to society and/or
the mechanism designer [34, 29, 5].
2. Implement these mechanisms by distributed protocols, with computational eciency empha-
sized in distributed algorithmic mechanism design [15, 16, 17] and extended to also emphasize
additional equilibrium considerations in distributed implementation [44, 38, 39], so that par-
ties are \faithful" and choose to perform message passing and computational tasks in ex post
Nash equilibrium. More recent works achieve a strong form of distributed implementation,
with provably no additional equilibria [31, 23], but require strong communication primitives.
Note that distributed algorithmic mechanism design is dierent in spirit from the traditional
problem considered in cryptographic protocols, in that parties have \true" private inputs (whereas
in cryptography all inputs are considered equally valid) and there is freedom to change how these
inputs are mapped to outcomes through choosing appropriate social choice functions to imple-
ment (whereas in cryptography, the functionality is pre-specied.) Nevertheless, recent works have
explored whether we can use the economic model to obtain `better' solutions to traditionally cryp-
tographic problems, namely to compute some pre-specied functionalities. One potential benet is
that we may be able to incentivize parties to provide their \true" private inputs along the lines of
Item 1 above; the papers [33, 45] explore for what functionalities and kinds of utility functions this
is possible in the presence of game-theoretic agents.
A second potential benet is that rational deviations may be easier to handle than malicious
deviations (thus possibly leading to protocols with better properties), while also preferable to
assuming a mixture of players at the honest and malicious extremes. This has led to a line of
work, started by Halpern and Teague [22] and followed by [21, 2, 26], studying the problems
of secret sharing and multiparty computation in the purely economic model, with all rational
participants. One can also require notions of equilibria that are robust against coalitions of rational
2players [2]. While this approach has proved to be quite fruitful, it too has limitations. Specically,
as pointed out in [21, 26], it seems dicult to construct rational protocols that are fair in the
standard communication model, because parties may have an incentive to stop participating once
they receive their own output. The works [22, 21, 2, 26], as well as [31, 23] applied to appropriately
designed mediated games, achieve fairness by using strong communication primitives (simultaneous
broadcast, \ballot boxes") that allow simultaneous exchange of information.
As mentioned above, we achieve fairness in the standard communication model by considering
a mix of rational participants together with a small minority of honest participants. Note that
Cleve's [12] proof that an honest majority is necessary in the cryptographic setting, by reduction
to the two-party case, no longer applies. The reason is that we cannot view a subset of the rational
parties as being controlled by a single super-party. Even in coalitional notions of equilibria, each
individual in that subset would only agree to a coordinated (joint) deviation if it is in its own
interest to do so.
Our protocol is for the share reconstruction problem in secret sharing, which we now describe
in more detail.
1.3 Secret Sharing
In a t-out-of-n secret-sharing scheme [43, 8], a dealer takes a secret s and computes n (randomized)
shares s1;:::;sn of s, which are distributed among n parties. The required properties are that (a)
any set of t parties can reconstruct the secret s from their shares, but (b) any set of fewer than t
parties has no information about s (i.e. they would have been equally likely to receive the same
shares for every possible value of s).
Secret sharing is a fundamental building block for cryptographic protocols [20, 7, 10, 41]. Typ-
ically, these protocols are structured as follows. First, every party shares its private input among
all the parties. Then the computation of the functionality is done on shares (to maintain privacy).
And at the end, the parties reveal their shares of the output so that everyone can reconstruct it.
Our focus in this paper is on this nal reconstruction step. Typically, it is assumed that there
are enough honest parties in the protocol to ensure that the secret can be reconstructed from the
revealed shares, even if some parties refuse to reveal their shares or even reveal incorrect values.
This turns out to be achievable if and only if more than a 2=3 fraction of the players are honest [11].
(In previous versions of this paper, we restricted attention to fail-stop deviations where a party may
stop participating in the protocol early but otherwise follows the prescribed strategy, in which case
only an honest majority is needed in the traditional cryptographic model.)
1.4 Rational Secret Sharing
It is natural to ask whether we can bypass this need for an honest majority by considering only
rational deviations from the protocol. As noted above, the study of secret sharing with only rational
participants was initiated by Halpern and Teague [22], and there have been several subsequent
works [21, 26, 2]. In these works, it is assumed that participants prefer to learn the secret over
not learning the secret, and secondarily, prefer that as few other agents as possible learn it. As
pointed out in Gordon and Katz [21], any protocol where rational participants reveal their shares
sequentially will not yield a Nash equilibrium. This is because it is rational for the t'th player to
stop participating, as she can already compute the secret from the shares of the rst t   1 players
and her own, and stopping may prevent the rst t   1 players from learning it.
One way to get around this diculty is to assume a simultaneous broadcast channel, where all
parties can broadcast values at the same time, without the option of waiting to see what values
3the other parties are broadcasting. All parties simultaneously revealing their shares is a Nash
equilibrium. That is, assuming all of the other parties are simultaneously revealing their shares, no
party can increase her utility by aborting (stopping early) instead of revealing. This basic protocol
is instructive because it has several deciences:
1. A simultaneous broadcast channel is a strong (and perhaps unrealistic) communication prim-
itive, particularly in the context of trying to achieve fairness, where the typical diculties are
due to asymmetries in the times that parties get information. For example, fair coin-tossing
is trivial with a simultaneous broadcast channel (everyone broadcasts a bit, and the out-
put is the exclusive-or), in contrast to Cleve's impossibility result for synchronous broadcast
channels [12].
2. Nash Equilibrium in this context is a very weak guarantee. For example, as argued by Halpern
and Teague [22], it seems likely that rational parties would actually abort. The reason is that
aborting is never worse than revealing, and is sometimes better (if t   1 other parties reveal,
then the tth party will always learn the secret and can prevent the other parties from doing
so by an abort.)
Halpern and Teague [22] and follow-up works [21, 2, 26] focus on the second issue. That is, they
allow simultaneous broadcast, and explore whether stronger solution concepts than plain Nash
equilibrium can be achieved. Halpern and Teague [22] propose looking for an equilibrium that
survives \iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies." They prove that no bounded-round
protocol can achieve a fair outcome in equilibrium when adopting this solution concept. However,
they and subsequent works by Gordon and Katz [21] and Abraham et al. [2] show that fair outcomes
are possible even with this equilibrium renement using a probabilistic protocol whose number of
rounds has nite expectation. Moreover, Abraham et al. [2] show how to achieve an equilibrium
that is resistant to deviations by coalitions of limited size. Kol and Naor [26] argue that \strict
equilibria" is a preferable solution concept to the iterated deletion notion used by Halpern and
Teague [22], and show how to achieve it with a protocol where the size of shares dealt is an
unbounded random variable with nite expectation. (They also show that a strict equilibrium
cannot be achieved if the shares are of bounded size.) In all of the above works, the protocols'
prescribed instructions crucially depend on the utilities of the various players.
The works of Lepinski et al. [31] and Izmalkov et al. [23] also can be used to obtain fair
protocols for secret sharing by making an even stronger physical assumption than a simultaneous
broadcast channel, namely \ballot boxes." Specically, they show how to compile any game with
a trusted mediator into a fair ballot-box protocol with the same incentive structure. Since the
share-reconstruction problem has a simple fair solution with a trusted mediator (the mediator
takes all the inputs, and broadcasts the secret i all players reveal their share), we can apply their
compiler to obtain a fair ballot-box protocol. But our interest in this paper is on retaining standard
communication models.
1.5 Our Results
In this paper, we address both issues above. Specically, we assume that there is a small number k of
honest participants (which can be much smaller than the secret-sharing threshold t), and the rest are
rational. In this setting, we exhibit a simple protocol that only requires a standard communication
model, namely synchronous broadcast, and achieves fair outcomes with high probability with respect
to a strong solution concept, namely (a set-Nash analogue of) trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
We describe both aspects of our result in more detail below.
4Synchronous Broadcast. With a synchronous (as opposed to simultaneous) broadcast channel,
the protocol proceeds in rounds, and only one party can broadcast in each round.2 When all parties
are rational, the only previous positive result in this model is in work by Kol and Naor [26], who
achieve a fair solution with an approximate notion of Nash equilibrium | no party can improve her
utility by " by deviating from the protocol. However, it is unclear whether such "-Nash equilibria
are satisfactory solution concepts because they may be unstable. In particular, how can everyone
be sure that some parties will not try to improve their utility by "? Once this possibility is allowed,
it may snowball into opportunities for even greater gains by deviation. Indeed, Kol and Naor argue
in favor of strict Nash equilibria, where parties will obtain strictly less utility by deviating (and
show how to achieve strict equilibria in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel).
In our work, we achieve an exact notion of equilibrium (i.e. " = 0). However, we allow a
negligible probability that the honest parties will fail to compute the secret correctly, so our notion
of \fairness" is also approximate. Nevertheless, we feel that the kind of error we achieve is preferable
to "-Nash. Indeed, the equilibrium concept is supposed to ensure that parties have an incentive to
behave in a particular manner; if it is too weak, then parties may ignore it entirely and whatever
analysis we do may be rendered irrelevant. On the other hand, if we achieve a suciently strong
notion of exact equilibrium, then we may be condent that players will behave as predicted, and we
are unlikely to see any bad events that are shown to occur with small probability under equilibrium
play.
Trembling-Hand Equilibrium. In order to establish the equilibrium properties of the protocol,
we introduce a framework of \extensive form games with public actions and private outputs," and
use the formalism of incomplete information games to model players' uncertainties about the inputs
(i.e. shares) of other players as well as uncertainty about which players are honest and which are
rational. (For simplicity, we assume that each player is honest independently with some probability
p, but with small modications, the result should extend to other distributions on the set of honest
players.) The solution concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium handles the uncertainty that a player
has about the shares dealt to other players and requires that beliefs are updated according to
Bayes rule \whenever possible," meaning that this occurs when the observed actions are consistent
with the equilibrium. A standard renement is that of Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
which captures the idea that the strategy is rational to follow regardless of the previous history
of messages; intuitively, this means that the equilibrium does not rely on irrational empty threats
(where a player will punish another player for deviating even at his own expense). In fact, we achieve
the additional renement of trembling hand perfect equilibrium [42], which strengthens this notion
by requiring that players update their beliefs in a consistent and meaningful manner even when
out-of-equilibrium play occurs. It is one of the strongest solution concepts studied for extensive
form games, and was advocated in this context by Peter Bro Miltersen (personal communication)
and Jonathan Katz [25].
Our Protocol. The protocol that we instruct honest players to follow is simple to describe.
The participants take turns broadcasting their shares in sequence. However, if any of the rst
t   1 parties deviates from the protocol by stopping and refusing to broadcast her share, then the
protocol instructs all parties subsequent to the rst t 1 to do the same. The intuition behind this
protocol is that if there is likely to be at least one honest party after the rst t 1 parties, then each
2For round eciency, sometimes people use a slightly more general channel where many parties can broadcast
in a single round, but deviating parties are can perform `rushing' | wait to see what others have broadcast before
broadcasting their own values. We describe how to extend our results to this setting below.
5rational party in the rst t 1 parties will also have an incentive to reveal its share because by doing
so, the honest party will also reveal her share and enable the rational parties to reconstruct the
secret. Then we observe that as long as the set of honest parties is a random subset of k = !(logn)
parties, then there will be an honest party after party t   1 with all but negligible probability, as
long as t  (1 
(1))n. Thus, assuming that parties have a nonnegligible preference to learn the
secret, we obtain an exact equilibrium in which everyone learns the secret with all but negligible
probability.
In order to deal with the possibility that some players may try to reveal incorrect shares, we use
information-theoretic message authentication codes (MACs) to authenticate the shares, following
Kol and Naor [26]. Intuitively, we can tolerate the (negligible) forgery probability of the MACs
(without getting an "-Nash equilibrium) because the rst t   1 players actually achieve strictly
higher utility by revealing a valid share than by not doing so.
In addition, the incentives in our protocol hold regardless of what information the rst t   1
players have about each others' actions, and similarly for the last n   t + 1 players. Thus, our
protocol can actually be implemented with only 2 rounds of communication (in contrast to all
previous protocols, which required a super-constant number of rounds); we discuss how to formalize
this below.
Modeling Contributions. While the intuition for our protocol is quite natural, modeling it
game-theoretically turns out to be quite delicate. As discussed above, we introduce a Bayesian
framework for capturing the uncertainty that players have about each others' secrets and which
other players are honest vs. rational. Additional modeling contributions include:
Set Nash We nd it useful to avoid specifying the exact actions that rational players should take
in situations where the choice is irrelevant to the overall strategic and fairness properties
of our protocol. We do this by developing a variant of the notions of Set-Nash [28] and
CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) Sets [6] for extensive-form games and trembling-
hand perfect equilibrium. Roughly speaking, this notion allows us to specify the equilibrium
actions only in cases that we care about, and argue that players have no incentive to deviate
from the specied actions provided that all other players are playing according to the specied
actions (even if they may act arbitrarily when the action is unspecied) and given the existence
of a small number of honest players. In addition, we show that, as long as all players are
acting consistently with the specied actions, then all honest players will learn the secret
with high probability. By adopting this solution concept we can also ensure that the protocol
(followed by honest parties) is itself consistent with the Set-Nash equilibrium specication.
Modeling Rushing To save on rounds, the cryptography literature often allows protocols that
specify messages for several players at once, but allows the possibility that deviating players
may wait to see other players' messages before computing their own (i.e. simultaneity is
allowed but not enforced). Modelling such \rushing" game-theoretically was posed as a
challenge in the survey of Katz [25]. As mentioned above, we argue that our protocol can
be collapsed to two rounds of communication. To capture the possibility of rushing game-
theoretically, we follow an idea of Kalai [24], and argue that the specied strategy remains an
equilibrium for every ordering of players within each round. Thus, players have no incentive
to wait for other players' messages; sending the same message will maximize their utility
regardless of what other players send in the same round. (An alternative approach to modeling
rushing would be to argue, in the spirit of an ex post Nash equilibrium, that players have
no incentive to revise their messages after seeing the actions (and thus learning the private
6information) of others so long as the others play the equilibrium. We do not explore this
possibility here.)
1.6 Future Directions
We view our work as but one more step in the line of work understanding the benets of bringing
together cryptography and algorithmic mechanism design. (See the survey [25].) While our main
theorem is admittedly far from achieving an end goal that one would want to implement as is, we
hope that our high-level message (regarding the benet of a few honest players with many rational
players) and our game-theoretic modelling (e.g. the Bayesian framework, the use of set-Nash, and
the modelling of rushing) prove useful in subsequent work. Some specic ways in which our results
could be improved are:
 Handling other distributions on (i.e. beliefs about) the set of honest players. Intuitively, this
should be possible by having the dealer randomly permuting the order of the players and
including the permutation in the shares (or publishing it). See Remark 5.1.
 Achieving solution concepts that are robust even to coalitional deviations from the protocol.
In an earlier version of our paper [35], we demonstrated coalition-proofness (against \stable"
coalitions) in a model that is even more simplied than the fail-stop one.
 Generalizing from secret sharing to secure multiparty computation. Indeed, this is the main
application for secret sharing and their reconstruction protocols.
2 Denitions
2.1 Games with Public Actions and Private Outputs
To cast protocol executions into a game-theoretic setting, we introduce the notion of extensive games
with public actions and private outputs. The basis of this new notion is the more standard denition
of extensive form games with perfect information. Extensive form games enable us to model the
sequential aspect of protocols, where each player considers his plan of action only following some of
the other players' messages (the \actions" of the game-theoretic model). The perfect information
property captures the fact that each player, when making any decision in the public phase of the
protocol, is perfectly informed of all the actions by other players that have previously occurred.
Thus, extensive form games with perfect information are a good model for communication on a
synchronous broadcast channel.
We build upon extensive form games with perfect information and augment them with an
additional nal private stage. This additional stage models the fact that at the end of the game,
each player is allowed to take some arbitrary action as a function of the history h 2 H of messages
so far. This action, along with the \history" of public actions that have taken place during the
execution of the game (as well as the players' inputs) has a direct eect on players' payos.
Working in the framework of Bayesian games of incomplete information, players i 2 N are
handed private inputs i that belong to some pre-specied set i (the \types" of the game-theoretic
model) and specify a distribution according to which the various inputs are chosen. Players' inputs
can be thought of as the shares for the secret-sharing scheme, and are generated jointly with the
actual secret. The secret is thought of as a \reference" value  2  that is not given to the players
at the beginning of the protocol (but may be determined by them through messages exchanged),
7and is used at the output stage along with private actions to determine player utilities; in game-
theoretic terms, this secret can be considered to be picked by \Nature" in the rst round of the
game and then induces a distribution  on the private types of agents. Nature sends each player
a private message about its own type. Despite this uncertainty about other players' inputs, this
remains a game of perfect information, with all previous actions of other players (just not that of
Nature) known to each player. One additional change we make from the standard denition of
Bayesian extensive-form games is that we allow the set of actions available to a player to depend
on her type. This will be useful later on when we wish to model the possibility that some players
are \honest," and will always follow a specied strategy even if it is not in her interest to do so.
Whether a player is honest or rational will be indicated in her type, and honesty will be modeled
by restricting the action sets of honest players to the message given by the specied strategy.
Denition 2.1 (Extensive game with public actions and private outputs). An extensive form game
with public actions and private outputs is a tuple   = (N;H;P;A;L;;;;u) where
 N = f1;:::;ng is a nite set of players,
  is a (possibly innite) set of possible reference values,
  = i2Ni, where i is a (possibly innite) set of possible private types of player i 2 N,
 values (;1;:::;n) 2   , are chosen jointly according to the distribution ,
 H is a (possibly innite) set of (nite) history sequences satisfying that the empty word  2 H.
The components of a history sequence h 2 H are called public actions. A history h 2 H is
terminal if fa : (h;a) 2 Hg = ;. The set of terminal histories is denoted Z.
 P : (H n Z) ! N is a function that assigns a \next" player to every non-terminal history.
 A = (A1;:::;An), where Ai is a function that assigns for every pair (i;h) 2 i  (H n Z) a
nite set Ai(i;h) of public actions available to player i = P(h).
 L = (L1;:::;Ln), where Li is a function that assigns for every pair (i;h) 2 iZ a (possibly
innite) set Li(i;h) of private actions available to player i 2 N.
 u = (u1;:::;un) is a vector of payo functions ui :     Z  L ! R.
An extensive form game with public actions and private outputs is interpreted as follows: the
reference value and the types of the players are selected according to the joint distribution . The
type i 2 i is handed to player i 2 N and the value  remains secret and aects the players'
utilities. This is followed by a sequence of actions that are visible by all players. After any history
h 2 H, player i = P(h) chooses an action from the set Ai(i;h). The empty history h0 = () is the
starting point of the game. Player i1 = P(h0) chooses an action a1 2 Ai1(i1;h0), which induces
a history h1. Then player i2 = P(h1) subsequently chooses an action a2 from the set Ai2(i2;h1);
these choices determines the next actions of the players, and so on until a terminal history h 2 Z
is reached. At this point, all players i 2 N simultaneously pick an action, bi, from the set L, of
available private actions. The utility (or payo) of player i for an execution of the game is then
determined to be the value ui(;;h;b1;:::;bn).
82.2 Strategies
The action chosen by a player for every history after which it is her turn to move, is determined
by her strategy function. As is required in extensive-form games, the strategy is dened for all
histories, even ones that would not be reached if the strategy is followed.
We refer to a pair (;h) 2   H as a state of the game. A state (;h) is said to be terminal
if h 2 Z. Given our notion of extensive form games with public actions and private outputs, we
distinguish between the public strategy of a player and her private strategy. The former is applied
to (a player's view of) non-terminal states and is what determines a player's actions during the
execution of the public part of the game. The latter is applied to (a player's view of) terminal
states and is what determines a player's output. A strategy for player i 2 N is thus a pair
si = (mi;fi), where:
 The public strategy mi is a function that takes a pair (i;h) 2 i  (H n Z) and produces a
public `message', mi(i;h) 2 Ai(i;h).
 The private strategy fi is a function that takes a pair (i;h) 2 i Z and produces a private
`output' fi(i;h) 2 Li(i;h).
A strategy si completely denes the actions of a player for every possible history h 2 H and
every possible private input i 2 i. We will allow the public and private strategy functions to
be mixed (i.e. randomized), where the randomization of the strategy is interpreted to be done
independently at each application of the function, if a player has multiple moves in the game.
Strategies that consist of deterministic functions are called pure, whereas strategies whose functions
have full support on Ai(i;h) are said to be fully mixed. We achieve fairness (with high probability)
in a pure strategy equilibrium but use fully mixed strategies in dening the concept of trembling
hand equilibrium.
We let s = (s1;:::;sn) denote the vector of players' strategies, where si = (mi;fi). The outcome
o of the game   under strategy s is the random variable (;;h;b1;:::;bn), where (;) 2   
are sampled according to , h 2 H is the terminal state that results when each player i 2 N is
given her type i 2 i, publicly follows the actions chosen by mi, and computes her nal private
output bi using fi. That is, h is a history h = (a1;:::;a`) such that for j = 1;:::;`   1 and
ij+1 = P(a1;:::;aj), we have that aj+1   mij(ij;(a1;:::;aj)), and bi   fi(i;h) for all i 2 N:
The value of player i's utility is totally determined by the outcome o. The initial distribution, ,
of the secret and the shares, along with the strategies si = (mi;fi) induce a distribution on the
outcome o, and thus on the utilities of the players.
2.3 Nash and Set Nash Equilibria
Let s = (m;f) be a strategy vector in  . Dene ui(;s) to be the expected value of the utility
of player i 2 N, when the types are selected according to the distribution  and all players follow
strategy s. (We consider games with histories with bounded length, and hence the expected value
of the utility is well-dened.) We assume that rational players seek to maximize expected utility.
The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) captures the idea that no player should have an incentive to
change her strategy, assuming that the other players play s i.
Denition 2.2 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy prole s is said to be a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium
for a game   if for all i 2 N and all strategies s0
i, ui(;(s i;s0
i))  ui(;s).
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of player i, player i maximizes her expected utility when the other players' types are distributed
according to the conditional distribution ji. However, since a player's strategy depends on her
type, this is equivalent to the formulation above, where we also take the expectation over i.
The protocol that we introduce for secret reconstruction will be dened in a way that leaves
the actions that a rational agent should follow only partially specied. This keeps the protocol as
simple as possible and also minimizes the dierence between the description of the behavior of an
honest player and that of a rational player.
For this, we allow each player to have a strategy that maps each information set (i.e. view of
the player) into a set of possible actions. More precisely, a set-valued strategy for player i 2 N is a
pair Si = (Mi;Fi), where:
 The public set-valued strategy Mi is a function that takes a pair (i;h) 2 i  (H n Z) and
denes a set of public messages, Mi(i;h)  Ai(i;h).
 The private set-valued strategy Fi is a function that takes a pair (i;h) 2 i  Z and denes
a set of private outputs Fi(i;h)  Li(i;h).
We write si = (mi;fi) 2 Si to indicate that strategy si is consistent with Si, i.e. with mi(i;h) 2
Mi(i;h) for all (i;h) 2 i  (H n Z) and fi(i;h) 2 Fi(i;h) for all (i;h) 2 i  Z (where these
inclusions should hold with probability 1 in case si is a mixed strategy).
Denition 2.3 (Set Nash equilibrium). A prole S = (S1;:::;Sn) of set-valued strategies is a
(Bayesian) Set Nash equilibrium for a game   if for all i 2 N, every (possibly mixed) s i 2 S i,
there exists a strategy si 2 Si so that for all strategies s0
i, ui(;(s i;s0
i))  ui(;s).
Since all strategies s0
i for player i are weakly dominated by a strategy si 2 Si, when other
players are playing strategy proles consistent with S i, then there exists a Nash equilibrium that
is consistent with S. To see this, consider a modied game in which all players are restricted to play
consistently with S. This game has a Nash equilibrium s by Nash's existence theorem. Now, we
argue that s must also be a Nash equilibrium even if players are not restricted to play consistently
with S. If a player could strictly improve her utility by any deviation from s, then the denition
of set-Nash guarantees that she could also do so playing consistently with S, contradicting the fact
that s is a Nash equilibrium in the modied game.
A trival set-Nash equilibrium has Si dened to include all possible strategies for all i. At another
extreme, if Si denes a singleton action set for all players at all information sets then this is a Nash
equilibrium. Our goal will be to nd set-Nash equilibrium for which every prole contained in it
achieves some desirable property (namely everyone learning the secret). This allows us to avoid
specifying moves that are not important for strategic properties.
Our denition of set-Nash equilibrium is stronger than the set-Nash equilibrium denition
introduced by Lavi and Nisan [28], who require only that for every pure s i 2 S i there exists some
si 2 Si for which ui(;s)  ui(;(s i;s0
i)) for all possible strategies s0
i. This earlier denition of
set-Nash is insucient to ensure that there is a Nash equilibrium consistent with the set-valued
strategy prole S. The problem is that upon restricting the game to S the only Nash equilibrium
may be a mixed equilibrium, yet there may be some strategy s0
i outside of Si that is strictly better
than all si 2 Si given that players 6= i play a mixed strategy consistent with S i.
On the other hand, our denition of set-Nash is weaker than the CURB (Closed Under Rational
Behavior) sets of Basu and Weibull [6]; see also a recent discussion in Benisch et al. [13]. A CURB
set requires that for every mixed strategy s i consistent with S i, all best-responses for player i
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that is consistent with Si. Given our set-Nash construct, it is rational for a rational player to play
inside the set given that other rational payers play inside the set. The strengthening provided
by CURB allows one to further argue that rational players will not play outside of the set, and
provides the tightest set-valued approximation to Nash equilibrium in the sense of containing all
Nash equilibrium solutions.
2.4 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
The basic notion of Nash equilibrium (or even strict Nash equilibrium) turns out to be an unsatis-
factory solution concept for extensive-form games. The reason is that a Nash equilibrium can rely
on \incredible" threats by players | ones that are needed to maintain the equilibrium but never
occur during the equilibrium play and would not be in the self-interest of the player if tested. A
more appealing solution concept is that of subgame perfect equilibrium. This is a standard strength-
ening of the notion of Nash equilibrium in that it requires that the equilibrium strategy is a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame of the original extensive form game.
In order to adapt the subgame perfect equilibrium concept to the Bayesian setting one has
to take into consideration the inherent uncertainty about player's types (and as a result about
the actions implied by their strategies). The assumption underlying the Bayesian setting is that
individual players have beliefs about the values of other players' types. The beliefs are in fact
distributions from which players think that the types of other players were drawn. At the beginning
of the game, the belief corresponds to the initial distribution  conditioned on the player's knowledge
of her own type. As this game of incomplete information progresses, players update their beliefs as
a function of other players' actions (recall that a player's actions may depend on her type).
At the heart of a solution concept for extensive-form games with incomplete information is a
requirement about the way in which the players update their beliefs. A straightforward approach
for a player to update her beliefs is to use Bayes rule to condition on her own view of the actions
taken in the game (as represented in her \information set"). This is the basic approach taken in the
game theory literature, and the one pursued in a previous version of this paper [36]. But such an
approach suers from the drawback that updating is not well-dened for views that occur with zero
probability, i.e. following out of equilibrium play. See [18] for further discussion of the diculties
related to Bayesian updating in extensive form games.
A stronger approach, also discussed in the game theory literature, is the one of trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium [42]. The idea behind trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is that updating is
not problematic if the strategies under consideration are fully mixed (since such strategies would
never incur an updating that conditions on a zero probability event). It thus becomes natural to
require that the equilibrium strategy is a best response in every subgame to some sequence of fully
mixed strategies that converge to equilibrium, and this is indeed the denition of trembling hand
equilibria. An interpretation of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is that it requires each player's
strategy to be robust to beliefs that are generated by play that could be the result of small mistakes.
A trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is also a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium, and when
applied to normal form games has the useful property of eliminating weakly dominated strategies.3
Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is one of the strongest solution concepts studied for exten-
sive form games, and an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is also a sequential
equilibrium (due to Kreps and Wilson [27]).
3See Osborne and Rubinstein [37] for an extended discussion, including an example to show that trembling hand
perfect equilibria of extensive form games can still include weakly dominated strategies.
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captures the way in which players update their beliefs as a result of other players' actions.
Denition 2.4 (Subgame). Let   be an extensive form game with public actions and private
outputs and s = (m;f) a fully mixed strategy prole for  . For a history h 2 H the subgame
 (s;h) = (N;Hjh;Pjh;Ajh;Ljh;;;jh;ujh) and substrategy sjh are dened as follows.
 Hjh is the set of sequences h0 for which: (h;h0) 2 H; i.e., Hjh = fh : (h;h0) 2 Hg.
 For every h0 2 Hjh, the function Pjh is dened by Pjh(h0) = P(h;h0).
 For every i 2 N, the function Aijh is dened by Aijh(i;h0) = Ai(i;(h;h0)).
 For every i 2 N, the function Lijh is dened by Lijh(i;h0) = Li(i;(h;h0)).
 For every i 2 N, the function uijh is dened by uijh(;;h0;b) = ui(;;(h;h0);b).
 The distribution jh is dened as  conditioned on h given strategy s.4
 The substrategy sjh = (mjh;fjh) is dened by mijh(i;h0) = mi(i;(h;h0)) and fijh(i;h0) =
fi(i;(h;h0)).
Given a strategy prole s and a strategy s0
i for player i, we denote by uijh(jh;s ijh;s0
ijh) the
expected value of player i's utility under strategy vector (s ijh;s0
ijh) in the game  (s;h). This is
interpreted as considering player i's expected utility when all players except player i follow strategies
s i, and assuming that until the history h has been reached player i has played according to strategy
si, and from that point on according to strategy s0
i.
Denition 2.5 (Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium). Let   = (N;H;P;A;L;;;;u) be an
extensive form game with public actions and private outputs. A strategy prole s is said to be a
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium for   if there exists a sequence of fully mixed strategy proles
(sk)1
k=0 converging to s so that for every history h 2 H, every i 2 N, and every strategy s0
i for
player i in the game  (sk;h) it holds that uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;sijh)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i) in the game
 (sk;h) for all k.
Our denition of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium requires that player i's strategy si de-
nes a best-response at every information set (every information set because the strategies are
fully mixed), where past perturbations of its own strategy are also considered within sk in den-
ing subgame  (sk;h). This denition is weaker than the standard trembling-hand denition for
extensive-form games in that it does not allow future trembles for player i (since we are replacing
all of player i's future actions in sk with the non-trembling si). But the denition is equivalent
to the standard denition in the secret-sharing game we will introduce, because each player only
has one public action and thus only one opportunity for o-equilibrium play that will be observed
by other players. In particular, the player whose turn it is to play at the initial history of the
subgame does not need to consider the possibility of its own future o-equilibrium play because
this does not aect the strategic problem facing other agents.5 We adopt our denition because it
is conceptually simple in comparison to the standard denition.
4Since s is fully mixed then every h occurs with nonzero probability, and so conditioning on h is well dened.
5The considerations that require that a player also consider its own future trembles can be modeled via the \agent
strategic form" and are relevant in the case that there are multiple public plays by a player. See Osborne and
Rubinstein [37] for an extended discussion.
12We dene a set-Nash analogue of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. To the best of our knowl-
edge, such a combination has not been previously considered in the literature. Given a history
h 2 H and a set valued strategy Si, we dene Sijh in the natural way (i.e., if Si = (Mi;Fi) then
Sijh = (Mijh;Fijh) where Mijh(i;h0) = Mi(i;(h;h0)) and Fijh(i;h0) = Fi(i;(h;h0))).
Denition 2.6 (Trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium). Let   = (N;H;P;A;L;;;;u) be an
extensive form game with public actions and private outputs. A prole S = (S1;:::;Sn) of set-valued
strategies is said to be a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium for   if for every s 2 S1    Sn
there exists a sequence of fully mixed strategy proles (sk)1
k=0 converging to s so that for every
history h 2 H and every i 2 N, there exists a strategy s0
i 2 Sijh such that for all strategies s00
i in the
game  (sk;h) it holds that uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ) in the game  (sk;h) for all k.
There is no requirement in the denition for the sequence of perturbed strategies to be consistent
with the prole S of set-valued strategies.
Lemma 2.7 (One-deviation property trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium). Let   be an exten-
sive form game with public actions and private outputs and histories with bounded length. The
set-valued strategy prole S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium if and only if for every
s 2 S, there exists a fully mixed sequence (sk)1
k=0 converging to s, so that for every player i 2 N,
every pair (i;h) 2 i  H such that P(h) = i, and every strategy s00
i for player i in the game
 (sk;h) such that s00
i (i;) 62 Sijh(i;), there is a strategy s0
i for player i in game  (sk;h) such that
s0
i(i;) 2 Sijh(i;) and uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ) in game  (sk;h) for all k
Proof. It is easy to see that this one-deviation property is necessary for a trembling-hand perfect
set equilibrium. For the sucient direction, x game  , some strategy prole s 2 S in set-valued
strategy prole S, and consider a fully mixed sequence (sk)1
k=0 converging to s for which the one-
deviation property holds. Proceed by backwards induction on the number of rounds in the subgame
 (sk;h). The induction hypothesis is that for every history h 2 H for which game  (sk;h) has
z  1 or less rounds, and every player i 2 N, there exists a strategy s0
i 2 Sijh such that for all
strategies s00
i in the game  (sk;h) it holds that uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ) for all k.
For the base case, game  (sk;h) has one round. Fix player i. If P(h) 6= i then s0
i 2 Sijh
trivially satises uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ) for all s00
i in the subgame. If P(h) = i (the
interesting case) then by the one-deviation property, for any s00
i = 2 Sijh there exists a strategy s0
i in
the subgame with at least as much utility and such that s0
i(i;) 2 Sijh(i;), and thus s0
i 2 Sijh
since the subgame has one round. To establish the inductive hypothesis, pick as a best-response
the strategy s0
i 2 Sijh with highest utility uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i), when conditioning on other players
playing according to sk
 i.
For the inductive case, consider a game  (sk;h) with z > 1 rounds. Fix player i. Again, the
case with P(h) 6= i can be trivially established from the inductive hypothesis on subgames with
z   1 rounds. Consider the interesting case of P(h) = i, and x s00
i in game  (sk;h) such that
s00
i (i;) = 2 Sijh(i;). By the one-deviation property, there exists a s0
i in game  (sk;h) such that
s0
i(i;) 2 Sijh(i;) with at least as much utility as s00
i . Pick as a candidate best-response to sk
 i
the strategy s0
i with the highest utility uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i): this strategy s0
i will have at least as much
utility as any s00
i in the subgame. Now appeal to the inductive hypothesis and modify s0
i on all
subsequent subgames to adopt a strategy ~ si consistent with Si, and with at least as much utility.
This modied strategy establishes the inductive hypothesis and completes the proof.
The dierences between this formulation and Def 2.6 are: (1) we switch order of quantiers,
saying for every strategy s00
i , there is something at least as good consistent with Si (rather than
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i consistent with Si that is at least as good as every s00
i ); and (2) we do not require
that s0
i is consistent with Si everywhere, but only at the history h. This is the sense in which it is
a one-deviation-like property (but note that we do allow s00
i to dier from s in many places). Later
deviations from Si are implicitly dealt with when considering longer histories. This one-deviation
property provides a useful simplication to the analysis of the secret-sharing game.
3 Secret Sharing
In this section we formally dene the idea of a secret sharing scheme. We then dene what is
a secret sharing reconstruction protocol, and cast it into a game-theoretic setting by dening a
corresponding reconstruction game (as induced by a given reconstruction protocol). The latter
allows us to reason about whether players have an incentive to follow the strategy specied by the
protocol, even if they are allowed arbitrary deviation from the protocol's instructions (including a
change of their private output).
3.1 Secret-Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme describes the basic requirements of secret sharing and is not game-theoretic.
In order to dene a secret sharing scheme we need to specify the sets from which the secret and its
shares are drawn, as well as a joint probability distribution under which the shares of a secret are
generated by the dealer (along with the secret).
Denition 3.1 (Secret sharing). A threshold secret sharing scheme is a tuple (N;t;;;;g) where
 N = f1;2;:::;ng is the set of players,
 t 2 N is the threshold of the scheme,
  is the set from which the \secret" is chosen,
  = i2Ni, where i is the set of possible shares of player i 2 N,
  is a joint probability distribution for the secret and the shares (;1;:::;n) 2   ,
 g = fgS :
Q
i2S i !  [ fggS is a collection of reconstruction functions, such that:
{ for each set S  N of size strictly less than t, gS((i)i2S) = ,
{ for each set S  N of size at least t:
Pr[gS((i)i2S) = ] = 1
where (;1;:::;n) are drawn according to .
{ for every S  N and (i)i2S such that gS((i)i2S 6=  it holds that
gT((i)i2T) = gS((i)i2S)
for every T  S of size at least t, and
 for every S  N of size less than t, the tuple (;(i)i2S) has the same distribution as
(U;(i)i2S) when  and the i's are chosen according to  and U is uniformly and inde-
pendently chosen in ,
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shares according to the distribution , and then distributing share i 2 i to player i 2 N. The
reconstruction functions are what enables any set S of at least t players to use their shares (i)i2S
in order to jointly reconstruct the secret. The scheme should also guarantee secrecy against any
subset S of less than t players. This requirement is expressed in the last item of Denition 3.1.
Our analysis will require the secret sharing to satisfy some additional properties. The properties
we require are natural in the context of secret sharing, are satised, for example, by the Shamir
secret sharing scheme [43].
Denition 3.2 (Admissible secret sharing). A threshold secret sharing scheme (N;t;;;;g) is
said to be admissible if it satises the following conditions:
 for every S  N of size less than t, the tuple ((i)i2S) is uniformly distributed in
Q
i2S i
and independent from , when  and the i's are chosen according to .
 for every S  N of size t, any j 62 S, and every j 2 j so that gS[fjg((i)i2S;j) 6= , there
exists a unique  2  so that gS[fjg((i)i2S;j) = .
To prevent players from revealing shares that are dierent than the ones they were dealt, we
will want to work with a secret sharing scheme that is authenticated.
Denition 3.3 (Authentication Scheme). An authentication scheme with forgery probability  2
[0;1] is a tuple (M;T;K;) such that:
 M is a set of messages, T is a set of tags, and K is a set of keys,
  is a probability distribution on K,
 there exist functions Auth : M  K ! T and Ver : M  T  K ! f0;1g, so that for every
m 2 M and for  that is chosen according to :
{ Ver(m;;) = 1 with probability 1 where  = Auth(m) = Auth(m;),
{ For every function A : M  T ! M  T and every  2 T, the probability that
Ver(A(m;);) = 1, and the rst output of A(m;) is not equal to m is at most .
Given a (plain) secret sharing scheme, one can convert it into an authenticated one by letting
the shares dealt by the dealer be tuples ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i), where i is a share chosen by the dealer
in the plain secret sharing scheme, j are keys for an authentication scheme, and i = Authi(i).
Denition 3.4 (Authenticated secret sharing). An authenticated secret-sharing scheme with forgery
probability  2 [0;1] is a tuple (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g) such that:
 ~  =   jNj,
 ~  =
Q
i2N ~ i, where ~ i = (i  T  KjNj 1),
 the tuple (N;t;;;;g) is a threshold secret-sharing scheme, where  =
Q
i2N i
 for every i 2 N, the tuple (i;T;K;) is an authentication scheme with forgery probability .
15Any secret sharing scheme can be converted into an authenticated one using following standard
technique [46, 41, 26]: the dealer chooses at random elements i;i 2 F;i 6= 0, and sets i =
i  i + i 2 F, where i 2 F is player i's share (in particular it is required that jFj > jj). The
value i (the tag) is given to player i, along with the share i. The other players each get the pair
i = (i;i) (the key). (Thus, in this example K = F  (F n f0g) and T = F.)
In order to prove that j is her true share, player j is required to broadcast the tag j. The
other players can then verify with high probability by checking that j = jj+j (the probability
of forgery can be made negligibly small by picking a suciently large F). Thus, in eect, the share
dealt by the dealer consists of a tuple ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i), where i = i i +i 2 F, j = (j;j)
and i 2 F is the original share chosen by the dealer. The above technique is applicable to any
secret sharing scheme (given an appropriate embedding of elements in  into elements in F).
3.2 Reconstruction Protocols
Once shares are distributed among the players, it is required to specify a protocol according to which
the players can jointly reconstruct the secret at a later stage (using the reconstruction function).
The reconstruction protocol prescribes a way in which the players compute their \messages", which
are chosen from a given xed \alphabet," and are then broadcast to all other players. The protocol
also species an output function that is used by the players to compute their (private) output.
One specic way of doing so would be to let the players broadcast their private shares in some
order. However, to avoid restrictions on the way in which the protocol proceeds, we give a more
general denition that allows the exchange of arbitrary messages.
Denition 3.5 (Secret sharing reconstruction protocol). A reconstruction protocol for a secret
sharing scheme (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g) is a tuple  = (;H;P;m;f) where
  is a nite set of messages,
 H   is a (possibly innite) set of protocol history sequences, satisfying that the empty
word  2 H. We let M(h) = fm : (h;m) 2 Hg  . A history h 2 H is terminal if
M(h) = ;. The set of terminal histories is denoted Z.
 P : (H n Z) ! N assigns a set of \next" players to every non-terminal history.
 m = (m
1;:::;m
n) is a vector of next-message functions, where the function m
i maps a pair
(~ i;h) 2 ~ i  (H n Z) to a message, m
i(~ i;h) 2 , for every history h such that i = P(h).
 f = (f
1;:::;f
n) is a vector of output functions f
i : ~ i  Z ! .
A reconstruction protocol for a given secret sharing scheme is implemented under the assumption
that the secret and shares (;1;:::;n) are chosen according to the distribution , and (i;i)i2N
are chosen according to . Player i's type is ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i). The protocol is interpreted as
follows: player i = P(h) chooses a message m = m
i(~ i;h) 2 . The empty history h0 =  is the
starting point of the execution. Player i0 = P() chooses a message m = m
i0(~ i0;) 2 . This
induces a history h1 = (m), where  m = (m1), and player P(h1) subsequently chooses a message
from the set ; this choice determines the next player to move, and so on until a terminal history
h 2 Z is reached. At this point all players can determine the value of their private output functions,
f
i (~ i;h). Generally, we are interested in secret-sharing protocols in which all players will compute
the secret correctly (i.e. f
i (~ i;h) =  with high probability over , provided all players follow the
protocol). Rather than require this as part of the denition, however, we will address explicitly
this in the statements of our positive and negative results.
163.3 Reconstruction Games
Based on the denition of a secret sharing protocol, we may now formalize an induced reconstruction
game. Loosely speaking, this is an interpretation of a reconstruction protocol as an extensive form
game with public messages and private outputs, in which arbitrary deviations from the protocol's
instructions are allowed. The interpretation of the protocol as a game is straightforward: protocol
histories correspond to game histories, messages in the protocol correspond to actions, next message
functions correspond to strategies, and the outputs correspond to output actions.
The reconstruction game allows player i 2 N the choice between continuing with the protocol's
prescribed instructions (and in particular choosing an action according to m
i), and deviating from
 (by sending some other message from ).
Denition 3.6 (Reconstruction game for secret sharing). A reconstruction game that corresponds to
reconstruction protocol  = (;H;m;f) for authenticated secret sharing scheme (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g)
is an extensive form game with public actions and private outputs   = (N;H;P;A;L;; ~ ; ~ ;u)
satisfying the following conditions:
 The set of private actions available to player i 2 N is Li = .
 For every nonterminal state (~ i;h) 2 ~ i(HnZ), the set of available public actions to player
i = P(h), is Ai(~ i;h) = .
 For an outcome o = (; ~ ;h;b1;:::;bn), the utilities ui(o) are a function of only i and the set
S(o) = fj : bj = g. Moreover, we require that:
1. If i 2 S(o) and i = 2 S(o0), then ui(o) > ui(o0),
2. If S(o) ( S(o0) and either i 2 S(o) \ S(o0) or i = 2 S(o) [ S(o0), then ui(o) > ui(o0).
The honest strategy vector in   is the pair s = (m;f).
A reconstruction game is interpreted as follows: a dealer selects a secret, shares and authen-
tication information from the distribution ~  and hands the input ~ i 2 i to player i 2 N. This
is followed by a sequence of actions (messages) that are prescribed by the reconstruction protocol
, and are in particular visible by all players. At each point h 2 H of the game, player i = P(h)
faces a decision of whether to continue according to the prescribed strategy m
i, or to deviate from
the prescribed instruction. In case the player has chosen to follow the strategy, she broadcasts
the message m
i(~ i;h). Otherwise, she may choose an arbitrary message from the set . Once a
terminal state (~ ;h) is reached, we allow each player to choose any private output from Li = .
The utility function is dened so that a player rst prefers to learn the secret over not learning
the secret, and secondly (all other things being equal) prefers that fewer other players learn the
secret. It will be convenient for us to restrict attention to utility functions that are linear in the
following sense:
Denition 3.7. A reconstruction game as above has linear utilities if there are real numbers
(ij)i;j2N such that for every outcome o = (;;h;b1;:::;bn) and player i 2 N, we have ui(o) = P
j2N ij  I(bj = ), where I denotes an indicator function. We refer to ratio  = mini(ii=   P
j6=i ij) as the players' preference for learning the secret.
The constraints on the utility functions in Def. 3.6 imply that ii > 0 for all i (players want to
learn the secret), ij < 0 for i 6= j (players want others not to learn the secret), and
P
j ij > 0
for all i (players want to learn the secret more than they want others not to learn); hence  > 1.
174 Our Protocol
4.1 Introducing an honest minority
Our goal is to show that every authenticated secret-sharing scheme has a reconstruction protocol so
that any reconstruction game that corresponds to it has an equilibrium strategy in which all players
learn the secret. To do this, we require that a small subset of honest players in the reconstruction
game always follows the strategy prescribed by the reconstruction protocol (whether or not this is
the best response to other players' actions). We model this scenario by assuming that the set of
honest players is selected according to some distribution that will specify to each player whether
she is to act honestly or rationally. The set of actions of an honest player will be then restricted
to coincide with the strategy prescribed by the reconstruction protocol. The set of actions of a
rational player will remain unchanged (i.e., as in the original denition of a reconstruction game).
Denition 4.1 (Reconstruction game with honest players). Let  = (;H;m;f) be a recon-
struction protocol for an authenticated secret sharing scheme (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g). A reconstruction
game that corresponds to  with honest players is an extensive form game with public actions and
private outputs   = (N;H;P;A;L;; ~   
; ~   ;u), satisfying the following conditions:
 
 = i2N
i, where 
i = fhonest;rationalg indicates whether player i 2 N is honest or
rational, and ~ i  
i is the set of possible types for player i 2 N,
  is a distribution on 
, and values (; ~ ;!) = (; ~ 1;:::; ~ n;!1;:::;!n) 2   ~   
 are
chosen according to the distribution ~   . We refer to  as the honest-player distribution.
 For every nonterminal state (~ ;h) 2 ~   H the set of available public actions to player i, is
Ai(~ i;!i;h) =

fm
i(~ i;h)g if wi = honest
 if wi = rational
 For every terminal state (~ ;h) 2 ~   Z the set of available private actions to player i, is
Li(~ i;!i;h) =

ff
i (~ i;h)g if wi = honest
 if wi = rational
 For an outcome o = (;(~ ;!);h;b1;:::;bn), the utilities ui(o) are a function of only i and the
set S(o) = fj : bj = g. Moreover, we require that:
1. If i 2 S(o) and i = 2 S(o0), then ui(o) > ui(o0),
2. If S(o) ( S(o0) and either i 2 S(o) \ S(o0) or i = 2 S(o) [ S(o0), then ui(o) > ui(o0).
The honest strategy vector in   is the pair s = (m;f).
We interpret a reconstruction game with honest players as follows. The private type of player
i 2 N consists of a pair (~ i;!i) 2 ~ i  
i that is drawn along with other player's types and
the reference value  according to the distribution ~   . The value of !i 2 fhonest;rationalg
determines whether player i is bound to follow the honest strategy (as prescribed by ), or will be
allowed to deviate from it. The constraints on the set of actions of each player create a situation in
which rational players are indeed free to deviate from the public strategy vector m (since they are
allowed to choose any action in ), whereas the honest players are in fact restricted to the single
action prescribed by m.
184.2 Our Main Result
We will show that assuming the existence of a small number of honest players, there is a recon-
struction protocol such that every corresponding reconstruction game has an equilibrium such that
with high probability all players learn the secret with certainty, provided that the set of honest
players is uniform among all sets of a suciently large size and every player has a nonnegligible
preference for learning the secret. Specically, our theorem is the following:
Theorem 4.2. Every authenticated secret-sharing scheme (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g), with t < jNj = n, has a
reconstruction protocol  such that the following holds. Let   = (N;H;P;A;L;; ~ 
; ~ m;u)
be a reconstruction game that corresponds to  with honest players and linear utility functions,
where m is a distribution over tuples (!1;:::;!n) 2 
 for which !i = honest with probability m=n
independently for all i 2 N, for some real number m 2 [0;n]. Suppose further that the players'
preference  for learning the secret satises:
 >
1   1=jj
1   1=jj   p(n;m)   
(1)
where p(n;m) = (1   m=n)n t+1  exp( m  (n   t)=n) and  is the forgery probability of the
authenticated secret-sharing scheme. Then   has a prole S = (S1;:::;Sn) of set-valued \rational"
strategies such that:
1. The honest strategy prole s = (m;f) is consistent with S,
2. S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium in  ,
3. For any strategy vector s 2 S, the probability that all honest players compute the secret
correctly in   is at least 1   (n   t + 1)   p(n;m), when the players' types are chosen
according to  and they follow strategy vector s.
4. For any trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium s 2 S, the probability that all players compute
the secret correctly in   is at least 1   (n   t + 1)   p(n;m), when the players' types are
chosen according to  and they follow strategy vector s.
5. S does not depend on the particular utility functions u in   (provided they satisfy (1)).
In the common case that t  (1   
(1))  n, observe that p(n;m) = exp( 
(m)) is negligible
provided that m = !(logn), i.e. the expected number of honest players is superlogarithmic. If,
in addition, the forgery probability  is negligible then Condition 1 simply says that a player's
preference for learning the secret should not be negligible.
The honest-player distribution m models a situation in which players have no information about
which other players are honest or rational, except for some a priori belief on the probability a given
player is honest. With small modications, the theorem should extend to other distributions  as
well; see Remark 5.1.
4.3 The reconstruction protocol
Let (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g) be an authenticated secret-sharing scheme with t < jNj and jj > 1. We
assume that a dealer distributes shares to the players according to the distribution , and would
like to design a protocol  = (;H;m;f) for secret share reconstruction.
The protocol proceeds in two stages, where in the rst stage a subset of t 1 players is instructed
to reveal their share to all other parties in some sequence, and in the second stage the remaining
19n   t + 1 players are instructed to reveal their share in some sequence, provided that none of the
t   1 players in the rst stage has failed to reveal her share. The individual parties will reveal
their share using a synchronous broadcast channel (as modeled by our denitions of reconstruction
protocols (Def. 3.5) and extensive games with public actions and private outputs (Def. 2.1)).
The stage in which a player is instructed to broadcast is xed in some arbitrary manner. For
the sake of concreteness, suppose that at stage 1 of the protocol, it is the turn of players 1;:::;t 1
to broadcast, and that at stage 2 it is the turn of players t;:::;n. The protocol will instruct
player i to either reveal her share i 2 i or not to reveal anything (symbolized by a special action
denoted ? 2 ). Specically, we will require that player i reveals i unless she is one of the stage
2 players and one of the rst t   1 parties to speak has chosen not to reveal their share. In the
latter case player i does not reveal her share either.
In addition to revealing her share, player i is required to send along the authentication informa-
tion i 2 T that was provided to her by the dealer. In case that either the authentication fails, or
that the player has refused to broadcast her message,6 player i will be considered as having failed
the authentication and chosen the special ? action.
After the two stages are completed, each player will locally use a reconstruction function gS 2 g
in order to try and compute the secret given the shares that have been revealed during the protocol's
execution. By the properties of secret sharing, it follows that a party will be able to compute the
secret (with certainty) at the end of the protocol if a set S  N of at least t 1 other parties have
revealed their shares, and otherwise she has no information about the secret (i.e. can compute it
with probability only 1=jj).
Protocol 4.3 (Reconstruction protocol). Let (N;t;; ~ ; ~ ;g) be an authenticated secret sharing
scheme. We specify a corresponding reconstruction protocol  = (;H;P;m;f) as follows:
  =
 S
i2N i  T

[ f?g, where ? = 2
S
i2N i  T,
 the set H consists of all sequences (a1;:::;a`) 2  such that `  n, aj 2  for all j.
 the set Z of terminal histories consists of all h = (a1;:::;an) 2 H of length n.
 for every history h 2 H of length i   1, the next player function is dened by P(h) = i,
 for every non-terminal history h = (a1;:::;ai 1) 2 H nZ, and any ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i) 2 ~ i,
the next-message function of player i = P(h) is dened as:
m
i(~ i;h) =
8
> <
> :
(i;i) if i < t;
? if i  t and Verj(aj) = 0 for some j < t,
(i;i) if i  t and Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < t:
(2)
 for every terminal history h = (a1;:::;an) 2 Z, and every ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i) 2 ~ i, the
output function of player i 2 N is dened as
f
i (~ i;h) =
(
gR((aj)j2R i;i) if gR((aj)j2R i;i) 6=  and Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < t
0 otherwise
where R i = fj 6= i : Verj(aj) = 1g, R = R i[fig, the gT's are the reconstruction functions
from the secret-sharing scheme, and 0 is an arbitrary element of .
6In an implementation, a player that fails to broadcast her value within some predetermined amount of time might
be considered to have refused to broadcast.
20The protocol corresponds to the honest strategy in the secret sharing game. A crucial property
of the honest strategy is that even players that adhere to it do not necessarily reveal their share.
This will be the case when one of the rst t 1 players aborts or deviates (by broadcasting ?). On
the other hand, if none of the rst t 1 players aborts or deviates, the honest strategy instructs to
reveal, even if the history subsequent to the rst t 1 rounds does contain an abort or a deviation.
Intuitively, allowing honest players to sometimes abort ensures that players who deviate from
the protocol's prescribed strategy in early rounds (the rst t 1) are penalized and unable to learn
the secret themselves. On the other hand, the honest players will continue to report their share
even if a deviation occurs in the tth round; this ensures that the players in the rst t   1 rounds
will learn the secret in addition to the other players, and thus provides fairness.
The protocol requires that the players in each stage reveal their shares in sequential order. As
we will argue in Section 5.1, the order in which the rst t   1 players broadcast has no eect on
the properties of the protocol, and similarly for the last n   t + 1 players. Thus, the protocol can
eectively be implemented with two rounds of communication.
4.4 Rational Strategies for Corresponding Reconstruction Games
We consider reconstruction games that correspond to the reconstruction protocol  with honest
players. By our hypothesis, an induced reconstruction game is a game with public actions and
private outputs   = (N;H;P;A;L;; ~   
; ~   m;u).
Our goal is to describe a set-valued rational strategy for the reconstruction game. The rational
strategy instructs both honest and rational players to follow the strategy prescribed by , except
that it does not specify how rational players should act in cases when the honest strategy may not
be in their self interest. Specically, we allow arbitrary action by the rational players when the rst
t   1 players have all revealed valid shares (whereas honest players must reveal in this case). The
honest strategy (equivalent to the earlier `protocol') is itself consistent with the rational set-valued
strategy prole.
Denition 4.4 (Rational set-valued strategy). The rational set-valued stategy Si = (Mi;Fi) for
player i 2 N in the game   is dened as follows:
 For every non-terminal history h = (a1;:::;ai 1) 2 H n Z so that i = P(h) and every
~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i) 2 ~ i, the public set-valued strategy of player i is dened as:
Mi(~ i;honest;h) = fm
i(~ i;h)g
Mi(~ i;rational;h) =
8
> <
> :
f(i;i)g if i < t;
f?g if i  t and Verj(aj) = 0 for some j < t;
 if i  t and Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < t.
 For every terminal history h = (a1;:::;an) 2 Z and every ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i) 2 ~ i, the
private set-valued strategy for player i 2 N is dened as:
Fi(~ i;honest;h) = ff
i (~ i;h)g
Fi(~ i;rational;h) =
(
 if Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < t
f0g otherwise.
where 0 is an arbitrary element of .
21Note that if all players follow any strategy s that is consistent with S and there exists an honest
player i 2 N with i  t then t out of the n players eventually reveal their share. Thus, if we can
argue that: (1) it is likely to have an honest player i 2 N with i  t, and (2) rational players are
incentivized to follow strategies consistent with S, then we will have obtained a fair solution to
the secret sharing problem (since all players are likely to learn the secret following the protocol's
execution). We start by proving that if all players follow a rational strategy s 2 S then everybody
is likely to compute the secret correctly. The game-theoretic analysis is then provided in the next
section.
Lemma 4.5 (Computing the secret). Suppose that players' types are chosen according to   m,
and that all players follow a strategy vector s 2 S. Then the probability that all honest players
compute the secret correctly in   is at least 1   (n   t + 1)   p(n;m). If moreover s is a Nash
equilibrium then the probability that all players compute the secret correctly in   is at least 1 (n 
t + 1)   p(n;m).
Proof. Since the players follow a strategy s 2 S, the rst t   1 players will reveal their shares. So
if there is a single honest player among the nal n t+1 players, the subsequent terminal history
will contain at least t properly authenticated shares. The probability that this is not the case is

1  
m
n
n t+1
 e m(n t)=n:
By the unforgeability of the authentication, the probability that any of the other messages contains
a falsely authenticated share is at most (n   t + 1). Thus, gR((aj)j2R i;i) 6=  with probability
at least 1   (n   t + 1)   p(n;m) (here we assume that the dealer always distributes "consistent"
shares). In this case, all honest players are instructed to compute the secret, and will indeed succeed
in doing so correctly.
Suppose now that the rational strategy s 2 S is a Nash equilibrium, and assume for contradiction
that there exists some rational player i 2 N, whose strategy si causes her not to compute the secret
correctly with some probability q (since Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < t we have that player i's may
choose to output any element in  in the private stage). Let s0
i be a strategy whose private
component instructs player i to reconstruct the secret whenever she can. As we saw before, with
probability 1 (n t+1) p(n;m), it indeed holds that gR((aj)j2R i;i) 6=  and so by following
s0
i, player i will be able to compute the secret correctly with that probability. By linearity of the
utility function this means that, conditioned on players j 6= i following s i, her expected utility in
case she follows s0
i is larger than her expected utility in case she follows si by an additive amount
of at least
ii(q   (n   t + 1) + p(n;m)):
Since ii > 0, we get that as long as q > (n   t + 1) + p(n;m) we obtain a contradiction to the
fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
5 Trembling-Hand Perfect Set Equilibrium
We prove that the rational set-valued strategy S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium in the
extensive game with public actions and private output  .
Lemma 5.1 (Trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium). The rational set-valued strategy vector S =
(M;F) from Denition 4.4 is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium in the game  .
22Proof: Our goal is to prove that S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium for the game
  = (N;H;P;A;L;; ~   
; ~   ;u).
By Lemma 2.7 it suces to prove that for every s 2 S, there exists a fully mixed sequence
(sk)1
k=0 converging to s, so that for every player i 2 N, every triplet (~ i;!i;h) 2 ~ i  
i  H
such that P(h) = i, and every strategy s00
i for player i in the game  (sk;h) such that s00
i (~ i;!i;) 62
Sijh(~ i;!i;), there is a strategy s0
i for player i such that s0
i(~ i;!i;) 2 Sijh(~ i;!i;) and
uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh(jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ) (3)
for all k. Note that it is sucient to prove the statement for suciently large k, since then we can
just start the sequence at a large enough value of k to handle all of the (nitely) many values of
i; ~ i;!i;h;s0
i;s00
i . Observe also that if Sijh(~ i;!i;) contains all possible actions available to player i
(i.e., Mijh(~ i;!i;) = Aijh(~ i;!i;) for h 2 H nZ and Fijh(~ i;!i;) = Lijh(~ i;!i;) for h 2 Z), then
what we need to prove holds trivially. This is because there does not exist s00
i (~ i;!i;) 62 Si(~ i;!i;).
Given s 2 S we dene a sequence (sk)1
k=0 of strategy proles in the following way. Fix any
sequence ("k) of positive real numbers such that "k ! 0 as k ! 1 (e.g. "k = 1=k). For any i 2 N,
any tuple (~ i;!i;h) 2 ~ i  
i  H, the strategy sk
i (~ i;!i;h) equals si(~ i;!i;h) with probability
1 k and is uniform over the action set Ai(~ i;!i;h) or Li(~ i;!i;h) (i.e., which is a singleton in case
!i = honest and is either  or  in case !i = rational). It can be seen that (sk)1
k=0 converges to
s as k ! 1, and that for every i 2 N and k, the strategy sk
i is fully mixed (because sk hits every
element in the action set with nonzero probability).
Let i 2 N, let h 2 H, such that P(h) = i, let (~ i;!i) 2 ~ i  
i, and let s00
i be any strategy for
player i in game  (sk;h) such that s00
i (~ i;!i;) 62 Sijh(~ i;!i;). We would like to show that there
exists some s0
i such that s0
i(~ i;!i;) 2 Sijh(~ i;!i;) for which Eq. (3) holds. Let ~ i = (i;i;fjgj6=i).
We start by considering the case of a nonterminal history h = (a1;:::;ai 1). As noted above,
there is nothing to prove when Mijh(~ i;!i;) = Aijh(~ i;!i;). In particular, this always holds
when !i = honest (because both sets are singletons) and it also holds when !i = rational and
Mi(~ i;!i;h) = .
This leaves us with the cases in which !i = rational and Mijh(~ i;!i;) = f(i;i)g (which
occurs when i < t) and Mijh(~ i;!i;) = f?g (which occurs when i  t and Verj(aj) = 0 for at
least one j < t). In the latter case, all actions a0;a00 give player i the same utility, because the
reconstruction strategies (and hence utilities under sk) do not depend on the action of player i or any
subsequent player. Specically, if h is any terminal history in which one of the rst t 1 players do
not reveal valid shares then F`jh(~ `;honest;) = F`jh(~ `;rational;) = f0g, so s`(~ `;!`;h) = 0,
and sk
`(~ `;!`;h) will equal 0 with probability 1   k and will be uniform on either f0g or  with
probability k.
We are left with the case in which !i = rational and i < t (which is at the heart of our
argument). We need to show that outputting (i;i) on (~ i;!i;) in subgame  (sk;h) is a better
response to sk
 i than any strategy s00
i that does not do this.
Claim 5.2. Suppose that !i = rational and i < t. Let s0
i = (m0
i;f0
i) be any strategy in game
 (sk;h) such that m0
i outputs (i;i) on input (~ i;!i;) and s0
i agrees with sk
i jh everywhere else, and
let s00
i be any strategy in game  (sk;h) such that s00
i (~ i;!i;) 6= (i;i). Then uijh( jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i) 
uijh( jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ).
Proof of Claim: First suppose that Verj(aj) = 0 for at least one j < i. Then, as
above, the reconstruction strategies (and hence utilities) do not depend on the action
of player i or any subsequent player, and thus the claim holds.
23So now suppose that Verj(aj) = 1 for all j < i. There are two ways that a previous
player j could have produced an authenticated share aj under strategy sk. It could have
sent aj = (j;j) using the \un-trembled" portion of the strategy, and it could have sent
aj using the \trembled" portion of the strategy that is uniformly random on . Note
that the trembled portion of the strategy is used with probability at most "k (indeed
at most (1   m=n)  "k, since only rational players have the possibility of trembling).
Moreover, by our denition of admissible secret sharing, these trembled and untrembled
strategies for the rst i   1 players are identically distributed once we condition on the
shares being valid wrt fjgj6=i (by Denition 3.2, Item 1). This implies that conditioned
on history (~ i;h), the probability that all of the previous actions aj are equal to the
un-trembled shares j is at least 1   "k  (i   1).
Now, suppose that player i reveals her authenticated share (i;i). Then, player i can
compute the secret correctly provided that none of the previous actions are trembles,
none of the future actions are trembles, and at least one of the last n   t players is
honest. We have already argued that, conditioned on (~ i;h), the probability that one
of the previous actions was a tremble is at most "k (i 1). The probability of a future
tremble is at most "k  (n   i). The probability that there are no honest players among
the last n   t is precisely p(n;m). In all, player i computes the secret correctly with
probability at least 1   p(n;m)   "k  (n   1). Thus her expected utility conditioned on
(~ j;h) is at least (1   p(n;m)   "k  (n   1))  ii +
P
j6=i ij. Here we use the fact that
strategy f0
i maximizes player i's expected utilities amongst all strategies in Fi, including
any strategy that attempts to compute the secret.
Suppose instead that player i sends a dierent message a00 6= (i;i). By the un-
forgeability of the authenticated secret-sharing scheme, the probability that a00 passes
verication is at most . If it is invalid, then the public actions of all future players will
be independent of their shares (they will either be ? or uniformly random trembles),
and thus player i's probability of computing the secret correctly will remain 1=jj (as it
is conditioned on history h). Other players will have private outputs that are either 0
or a random tremble of this, and hence will also compute the secret correctly with prob-
ability 1=jj. Thus player i's expected utility conditioned on (~ j;h) is (1=jj)
P
j ij.
Player i strictly prefers to send a0 = (i;i) provided that
(1   p(n;m)   "k  (n   1))  ii +
X
j6=i
ij > (1=jj) 
X
j
ij:
This holds for suciently large k by our hypothesis (1) on the players' preference for
learning the secret.
We now turn to consider the case of a terminal history h = (a1;:::;an). As noted above,
there is nothing to prove in the case where Fijh(~ i;!i;) = Lijh(~ i;!i;). This always holds when
!i = rational and Fijh(~ i;!i;) = , and when !i = honest (since in this case Fijh(~ i;!i;)
and Lijh(~ i;!i;) are both singletons). So we are left with the case in which !i = rational and
Fijh(~ i;!i;) = f0g (which occurs if Verj(aj) = 0 for some j < t).
Claim 5.3. Suppose that !i = rational and Verj(aj) = 0 for some j < t. Let s0
i be a strategy in
game  (sk;h) that outputs 0 2  on (~ i;!i;) and agrees with sk
i jh everywhere else, and let s00
i be
any other strategy. Then uijh( jh;sk
 ijh;s0
i)  uijh( jh;sk
 ijh;s00
i ).
24Proof of Claim: Since Verj(aj) = 0 for some j < t, we have that for all ` > t, the
strategy s` instructs player ` > t to send ? (whether !` = honest or !` = rational).
So the only way the history h can include messages other than ? for players `  t
is via the random trembles of sk
`. Since the trembles are independent of the shares `,
they do not reveal any information about them. This remains true even if the trembles
happen to pass the authentication. In addition, by the secrecy property of the secret
sharing scheme (last item in Denition 3.1), the rst t   1 messages do not reveal any
information about the secret to any of the players. Thus, conditioned on (~ i;h) player
i has no information about the secret. Since sk
 i instructs all other players to output
0 or a uniformly distributed element of , and given that the secret  is uniformly
distributed in  (conditioned on (~ i;h)), we have that any action 00 2  will yield
player i the same expected utility as 0, namely (1=jj) 
P
j aij.
Remark 5.1. As discussed earlier, the honest-player distribution m in Theorem 4.2 models the
situation where players have no a priori information about which players are honest or rational,
except the probability (m=n) with which an individual player is honest. The independence between
dierent players in m is not essential to the proof; it applies to any distribution in which there is
a high probability of an honest player among t;:::;n, such as the uniform distribution on vectors
! 2 fhonest;rationalgn in which exactly m components are honest. An opposite extreme is the
case where the set of honest players is not random, but is instead an arbitrary xed set of m players,
known to all. Our protocol can be modied to handle this case by rst randomly permutating the
order in which players speak; this guarantees that there will be an honest player among t;:::;n with
high probability. Now the rational strategy would have the rst t   1 players determine whether
the permutation is `good', reveal their share if it is, and send ? otherwise. This analysis can be
found in the preliminary version of our paper [35], where it is also shown to be coalition-proof in
the sense of Bernheim et al. [4]. By combining these ideas, it may be possible to handle arbitrary
distributions on the set of honest players (provided there are at least roughly m honest players with
high probability).
5.1 Modeling Rushing
So far the reconstruction protocol has specied a particular sequence with which the rst t   1
players each reveal their shares, and similarly for the subsequent sequencing of the remaining
n (t 1) players. But the protocol satises a robustness property: the strategy prescribed to both
rational players and honest players in both stage 1 (for the rst t   1 players) and in stage 2 (for
the remaining n t+1 players) is invariant to the action selected by other players within the same
stage. This makes the equilibrium robust, also, to a simpied two round protocol in which t   1
players are selected to send a message in the rst round and the remaining n (t 1) players in the
second round. The communication channel within each round need not provide for synchronous
broadcast, and can be just a simultaneous broadcast channel that allows for \rushing" where a
player can wait and see the message sent by another player before choosing its own message. Not
sending a message during a round is interpreted as ?.
Formal analysis of this rushing game could be provided as a partially-specied game in the
spirit of Kalai [24], wherein the same equilibrium survives many extensive variations of a two-round,
simultaneous-move Bayesian game-form for the protocol. This two round simultaneous-move secret-
sharing game would ask each of a random set t 1 of players to broadcast a message on a synchronous
25communication channel. Each of the remaining n (t 1) players would then be asked to broadcast
a message on the synchronous communication channel. Finally, all players would select a private
action just as in our n-round protocol. The strategy described earlier remains an equilibrium in
this two-round game, and also for any sequencing of play within the two rounds. Kalai develops a
general theory of structural robustness in which equilibrium are robust to variations in details about
a game, for the setting of large semi-anonymous games that satisfy a payo continuity property.
We can achieve similar robustness properties in our secret-sharing games.
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